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[Crim. No. 4797. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1947.]

In re WILLIAM JEROME PHYLE, on Habeas Corpus.
(1] Criminal Law-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death
Penalty-Insanity. - In view of Pen. Code, §§ 3700-3704, relating to proceedings when a person under judgment of death
is believed to be insane, a person who has been adjudged insane
and committed to a state hospital after conviction, sentence
and delivery to a warden of a state prison for execution, and
who, following certification by the superintendent of such
hospital that he is sane, has been returned to the custody of
the warden for execution, has no right to a judicial determination of his restoration to sanity.
[S] Id.-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death PenaltyInsanit7.-Under Pen. Code, § 3704, the superintendent of the
state hospital to which one has been committed following a
death sentence is not authorized to initiate judicial proceedings
to determine the question of his restoration to sanity.
[3] Statutes-Oonstruction-With Reference to Other Laws: Presumptions.-Pen. Code, § 1372, relating to restoration to sanity of a person adjudged insane before conviction, and § 3704,
relating to restoration to sanity of a person adjudged insane
after conviction and sentence, are Mt ptJri fllGfeN, and the
interpretation of a sentence in one controls the interpretation
of virtually the same sentence in the other. It must be assumed that, when the Legislature adopted § 3704, it was aware
of the construction that had been given a substantially similar
provision of the Criminal Practice Act, § 591.
[4] Crf.mjnaI Law-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death
Penalty-Inaanity.-Pen. Code, § 3704, relating to proceedings

[1] See 8 OaLJur. 845.
McX. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-10] Criminal Law, 11043; [3]
Sta~ 1Il86, 1»0(4).
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on restoration to sanity of a person adjudged insane after
death sentence, is not modified by Welf. & lnst. Code, § 6760,
prescribing proceedings on recovery of a person who is insane
when brought to trial.
Id.-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death PenaJtyInaanity.-Regardless of what the common law powers of a
court may be, when the procedure for the determination of
the question of the sanity of a person who has been sentenced
to death is covered by statute, a court has no inherent power
to determine that question; such a person has no right to •
judicial determination of the question unless the statutes so
provide.
Id.-Judgment-Slispension of Execution of Death PenaltyInsanitr.-The statutory procedure for determining the question of restoration to sanity of one who was adjudged insane
following his conviction and the imposition of a death sentence (Pen. Code, § 3704), is constitutional as against the
objection that defendant's right to an adjudication of such
question is protected by the due process clauses of the state
and federal Constitutions.
Id.-Judgment-Suspension of Execution of Death PenaJtyInsanitr.-The mere fact that a court of law has adjudicated
that defendant was insane at the time of trial does not give
him a vested right to the status of an insane person thereafter,
and where he has been adjudged insane following his conviction and sentence and his execution was suspended only
until recovery of his reason, a court of law need not determine that he has been restored to sanity.
Id.-Jucigment-Suspensiou of Execution of Death PenaltrInsanity.-The separation of powers provision of Const., art.
3, § 1, is not violated by leaving to administrative officers
the final determination of the sanity of a person who was
adjudged insane following his conviction and sentence, and
whose execution was suspended pending recovery of his re&SOD.

;'[8] Id.-Jvdpumi--Suspension of Execution of Death Penalty~."
Insanity.-Asauming that a warden's power with regard to
questioning the sanity of a prisoner who has been sentenced
to death (see Pen. Code, § 3701), is judicial, conferring such
power on him is no violation of Const., art. III, § 1, mce
art. X, § 7, specifically provides that such officers may have
, " such powers in respect to "reformatory or penal matters, ..
.~ the Legislature may prescribe."

.

';', .[5] Insanity supervenin& after ocm"riction and sentence of death,
:iote, 49 A.L.B. 804..
',,:.

)
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Id.-J'udgmen~uspe::.sion of Execution of Death Penalty
-Insa.nity.--Assuming that the power of the superintendent
of a state hospital with regard to· determining whether a prisoner under sentence of death has recovered his reason since
eommitment to the hospital, is a judicial power, there is no
unlawful delegation of this power in view of the specific
authorization in Const., art. X, § 7.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ discharged.
AI Matthews, Morris Lavine and Wallaee S. Myers for
Petitioner.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Linn,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-William Jerome Phyle was found guilty
of first degree murder and sentenced to be executed. The
judgment was aBirmed by this court (PeopZe v. PkllZe, 28 Cal.
2d 671 [171 P.2d 428]), and the date of execution was set
for December 26, 1946. While defendant was awaiting execution at the state prison at San Quentin, the warden of that
prison initiated proceedings pursuant to section 3701 of the
Penal Code to determine the question of defendant's sanity.
After a jury trial defendant was adjudged insane and committed to the Mendocino State Hospital. On January 18,
1947, the superintendent of that hospital certified to the
Governor that defendant had recovered his reason. The Governor then issued a warrant to the warden of the state prison
at San Quentin appointing May 2,1947, the day of execution.
One of defendant's attorneys ftled a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in this court, contending that the superintendent of the Mendocino State Hospital had no authority under
the law of this state to release the defendant to the warden
of the state prison at San Quentin without an adjudication
of a competent court that defendant had .r8COvered his reason.
This court issued the writ for the purpose of giving consideration to this contention.
Section 1367 of the Penal Code provides that "A person
cannot be tried, adjudged to punishment, or punished for a
public offense while he is insane." The· question of defendant'. sanity at the time of the e,wnmission of the offense or
at the time of his conviction or sentence is not involved in
tIUa proceedin," The only question presented is whether a
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person who has been adjudged insane after conviction, sentence, and delivery to a warden of a state prison for execution, has the right to a judicial determination of the question
of his restoration to sanity.
[1] The procedure for determining the question of the
sanity of a prisoner under sentence of death is speci1ied in
sections 3700 to 3704 of the Penal Code. Section 3700 provides that, "No judge, court, or officer, other than the Gov,ernor, can suspend the execution of a judgment of death, I
except the warden of the State prison to whom he is delivered .
for execution, as provided in the six succeeding sections, unless an appeal is taken." Four of the six sections referred
to relate to the question of the prisoner's sanity. The other
two, which prescribe the procedure for determining the ques"tion of the pregnancy of a woman sentenced to dea.th, are
~ not material in this case.
h Section 3701 provides for the determination of the ques~.' tion of defendant's sanity after he has been delivered to the
~"state prison: "If after his delivery to the warden for execu!: tion, there is good reason to believe that a defendant, under
~.. judgment of death, has become insane, the warden must call
~, such fact to the attention of the district attorney of the county
~' in which the prison is situated, whose duty it is to immedi; ately file in the superior court of such county a petition,
~.stating the conviction and judgment, and the fact that the
(defendant is believed to be insane, and asking that the quest.tion of his sanity be inquired into." Section 3702 provides
'the procedure for the hearing held pursuant to section 3701.
~' Section 3703 provides that "The verdict of the jury must be
:eD;tered upon the minutes, and thereup~n. the court must make
"and cause to be entered an order recltmg the fact of such
'. 'inquiry and the result thereof, and when it is found that the
", ldefendant is insane, the order must direct that he be taken
f'~ ,a State hospital for the insane and there kept in a state
~,-of confinement until his reason is restored."
!~tSection 3704 provides for the disposition of the defendant
'after the court's order is entered: cc. • • if it is found that
r the defendant is insane, the warden must suspend the executtion and transmit a certi1ied copy of the order mentioned in
['the last section to the Governor, and deliver the defendant,
ftogether with a certi1ied copy of such order, to the medical
; "superintendent of the hospital named in such order. When
¢~the ~efendant recovers his reason, the superintendent !",ust
, '"rli/fl tMf fact to the Governor, who must thereupon lS8U8
CO
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to the warden his warrant appointing a day for the execution of the judgment, and the warden shall thereupon return
the defendant to the State prison pending the execution of
the judgment." (Italics added.)
It is apparent from a reading of sections 3700 to 3704 of
the Penal Code that there is no provision for a judicial determination of the question of the sanity of a defendant delivered to the warden of a state prison for execution except
as set forth in section 3701. In fact, section 3700 expressly
provides that after the defendant has had his appeal to this
court, the execution of his sentence lies exclusively within the
control of the Governor, and the warden of the prison.
Petitioner contends, however, that the question of restoration to sanity after a judicial determination that defendant
is insane is necessarily a judicial question and that the statute
must be interpreted as if it provided that, "w1l.en it ka8 been
judicially determined t'kat defendant ka8 recovered 1I.is reason
the superintendent must certify that fact to the Governor.
• • ." Petitioner maintains that in view of the eases construing statutory provisions regarding the restoration to sanity
of a defendant adjudged insane during the course of his trial
(Pen. Code, §§ 1367-1372) defendant has a right to a judicial
determination of the question of his restoration to sanity.
Petitioner relies on the rule that a person confined in a state
hospital pursuant to those provisions has a right to habeas
corpus to determine whether his sanity has been restored.
(Gardner v. Jones, 126 Cal. 614, 618 [59 P. 126]; In re Buc'kanan, 129 Cal. 330, 331 [61 P. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378]; see
Peoplev. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 136, 145 [47 P'2d 724].)
It is true that a defendant committed to such an institution has a right to his release therefrom, if it is determined
on habeas corpus that he is improperly held because he is
presently sane. If it is found that he is sane, he is returned
to the custody of the sher:i1f and his trial proceeds. (In re
Buc'kaMn, supra, at p. 336.) In the present ease, petitioner does not seek release of defendant from the state hospital, on the ground that he is sane, for if he were foun~
sane he would be delivered to the warden for execution.
Instead, petitioner seeks the return of defendant to the state
hospital, on the ground that he was improperly discharged
therefrom. There is no authority, however, for the proposition that defendant has a right to habeas corpus or other
judicial proceeding to determine the question of his sanity
after his release from the state hospital. In fact, section 3700

)
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of the Penal Code eXpressly prohibits such a proceeding.
Once the superintendent certifies that defendant is sane, he
is remanded to the custody of the warden for execution and
"No judge, court or other officer other than the Governor"
can then suspend the execution of the judgment, "except the
warden of the State Prison to whom he is delivered. • . ."
[t] Nor is there any provision for the superintendent to
initiate judicial proceedings to ascertain the fact to which he
certifies. The superintendent is not authorized, as the warden
. is, to call the question to the attention of a district attorney
for a judicial determination. Instead, it is his duty to certify the fact to the Governor "who must thereupon issue his
warrant appointing a day for the exeeution.•.•" Sinee the
method of determining the question of the sanity of a person
awaiting execution is controlled by the Legislature and sinee
'the Legislature has provided in Penal Code, section 3700, that
the courts cannot suspend the execution of a judgment' of
death and has provided in section 3701 for a judicial proceeding to detennine the question of defendant's sanity only when .
.the warden invokes such a proceeding, it is clear that the
question of restoration to sanity under section 3704 is a question for the determination of the superintendent.
, [3] This interpretation of section 3704 is in accord with
the interpretation by this court of the almost. identical language of section 1372, which relates to the question of the
restoration to sanity of a person who has been judicially adjudged insane before conviction. Section 1372, which was
amended to its present form at the same time as the provisions
with respect to the restoration to sanity of a person adjudged
insane after conviction and sentence (Stats. 1905, pp. 699,
704) ,. provides: "If the defendant is received into the state
hospital he must be detained there until he becomes sane.
When ke becomes sane tke 8'Upmntendent must certify tkat
~GCt to the sherUf and district attorney of the' county. The

/
/

.' -In 190G the provisiOJUl of 3704 were ecm.tained ill eection 1224, which
... repealed and reeuaeted ill 1941 as section 3704 with the addition
If the 1ast phrase that "the warden shall thereupon return the defendlilt to the state prison pending the execution of the judgment." Beeion 10000 adopted at the lI8J11e time provides that, "The provisio118 of
:tart 3 of this code (whieh includes sections 3700 to 3704J, in 80 far
• they are sllbstantiall;y the same as existing provisio118 relating to
he same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements and 'coninuati0118 thereof and not as new enactments." The addition of the
sat ,hrase to section 3704 is clearly not material to this case or to
be mterpretation of that aectiOIl with reepect to the duties of the
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sheriff must thereupon • • . place him in proper custody
until he is brought to trial or judgment as the case may be, or
is legally discharged." (Italics added.)
In construing section 1372 in People v. Superior Court, 4
Ca1.2d 136, 144-147 [47 P.2d 7241, this court held that the
question of defendant's restoration to sanit.y is for the superintendent to determine. The court stated that once a person
has been committed to a state hospital under section 1372.
" 'no court in this state is authorized to discharge him therefrom, or to restore him to the capacity of a sane person,
under any circumstances, except upon a writ of habeas corpus.
The power to discharge him otherwise than upon habeas
corpus is vested exclusively in the officers of the asylum' •..
The Penal Code undoubtedly prescribes the exclusive manner
by which the proceedings shall be set in motion when the
defendant is restored to sanity or is not insane." (People v.
Superior Court, supra, at 145.) After the superintendent
determines that a defendant placed in his custody pursuant
to sections 1370 to 1372 of the Penal Code is sane, the defendant is returned to the court in which his trial had begun.
It is not necessary for the verdict finding him insane to be
vacated before the trial court may proceed. (People v. Rice,
83 Cal.App. 55, 60 r256 P. 450].)
When the provisions in question of both section 1372 and
section 3704 were adopted in 1905, a· substantially similar
provision of the Criminal Practice Act (Stats. 1851, p. 278,
§ 591) relating to the restoration to sanity of a person adjudged insane before judgment had already been interpreted
by this court. Section 589 of that act provided for the
delivery of a person found to be insane before judgment to
the custody of a "proper person" and for his redelivery by
such person to the sheri1f upon his becoming sane. Section
591 provided that, "If the defendant be received by the
person so appointed he must be detained by him until he
becomes insane. When he becomes sane, such person shall give
.nofw. to the Sheri1f and District Attorney of the County of
that fact!' (Italics added.) In People v. Parrell, 31 Cal. 576.
580, it was held that this provision did not require a judicial
determination of the question of restoration to sanity and
that the verdict of insanity under which the defendant was
committed did not have to be vacated before the defendant
could be tried. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial

)
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court to proceed with the trial of the defendant without
instituting "some form of judicial inquiry into the present
sanity of the accused." (People v. Rice, 83 Cal.App. 55, 60,
IUpra; People v. Superior Court, 4 Ca1.2d 136, 144-147,
IUpra.)

Since these statutes are obviously in pari materia, the interpretation of a sentence in one controls the interpretation
t of virtually the same sentence in the other. It must be assumed
also that when the Legislature adopted the present provisions
W. of section 3704, it was aware of the construction that had
I'i been given section 591 of the Criminal Practice Act.
;,.
[4] Petitioner contends, however, that section 3704 is
~, modified by section 6760 of the Welfare and Institutions
(, Code, which provides: "A. patient committed to a State hospital under the provisions of Chapter VI, Title X, Part II
> of the Penal Code. ~hall, upon the certi1icate of the superintendent that the person has recovered, approved by the
superior judge of the county from which the patient was
committed, be redelivered to the shel'i1t of such county, and
. dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the above:" mentioned chapter of the Penal Code." Even if it be assumed
that this section requires a judicial determination of the
1
question of the restoration to sanity of one committed pur~ suant to the chapter of the code referred to (cf. People v.
Superior Court, supra, 143-146), it clearly has no application
to the present case, for petitioner was not committed under
" the provisions of that chapter of the Penal Code, but under
~.". the provisions of chapter 2, title 3, part 3 of that code with
. respect to which there is no provision comparable to section
. 6760 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requiring approval
. of the superintendent's cretificate by the superior judge of
the county from which the patient was committed.
[15] Petitioner contends also that there is an inherent
judicial power to determine the question of restoration to
sanity, regardless of the statutes. He cites for this proposition the case of People v. Scott, 326 ID. 327, 338 [157 N.B.
247] wherein it was held, in the absence of a statutory provision regarding restoration to sanity, that a jury trial of the
.". question of sanity was proper. Where there is a statute
'. that declares that the superintendent of the state hospital
• where the prisoner is confined may declare the prisoner's
. aanity restored, a person awaiting execution has no right to a

r
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judicial determination of his restoration to sanity. (Barrett v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 153, 160 [259 S.W. 25].) By
adopting section 3700 of the Penal Code prohibiting the
courts from suspending the execution of a judgment of death
except on appeal, the Legislature has provided in effect that
the courts of this state are without power, except as provided
by statute, to determine the sanity of a person who has been
sentenced to be executed for a capital offense and is in the
custody of the warden of a state prison for the purpose of
execution. (See People v. Sloper, 198 Cal. 601, 608 [246 P.
802].) Thus, regardless of what the common law powers of
a court may be, when the procedure for the determination
of the question of the sanity of a person who has been
sentenced to death is covered by statute, a court has no inherent power to determine that question and such a person
has no right to a judicial determination of the question unless
the statutes so provide. (State v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376,
381 [49 P.2d 408] ; Howell v. Kincannon, 181 Ark. 58 [24
S.W.2d 953, 956]; Cribb v. Parker, 119 Ga. 298 [46 S.E. 110];
Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554 [28 S.E. 68, 70, 38 L.R.A. 577] ;
NoNes v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 404 f18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed.
515] ; see Baranoski's Case, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 264, 266; cases collected 49 A.L.R. 804; 38 L.R.A. 577, 588.)
In California, moreover, this matter has never been governed by common law principles. Since the first Criminal
Practice Act in this state (Stats. 1850, p. 312, § 505; § 473
of the Criminal Practice Act of 1851, Stats. 1851, p. 264;
§ 1224 of Pen. Code of 1872), the question of the sanity
or restoration to sanity of such prisoners bas been governed
by statute. Until 1905, either the Governor or a judge of
the trial court could determine whether or not a prisoner was
sane and order his execution after he had been found insane
by an inquisition. This provision was changed in 1905 by
an amendment to section 1224 of the Penal Code whereby
all ~ference to the court was omitted and the Governor was
directed to issue a warrant for the execution of the prisoner
on receipt of a certificate from the superintendent of the
hospital. Section 3704 is a continuation of this provision.
(Pen. Code, § 10000.) The courts of this state have therefore
never had the right, independent of statute, to determine the
question of the restoration to sanity of a defendant who is in
the custody of a warden of a state prison for execution pursuant to & lawful judgment of death.
.

i
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[6] The question remains whether the statutory procedure
for determining the question of restoration to sanity is constitutional. Petitioner contends that defendant has a right
to an adjudication of the question of his sanity, protected
by the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of California. There is no such
right under either Constitution. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the procedure for determining the question of the sanity of a person who has been properly convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death is a matter for the Legislature and courts of the jurisdiction in
'.which the defendant is convicted and presents no federal
question. (Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 404 [18 S.Ct. 87,
·42 L.Ed. SIS].) On this ground the court aftirmed a decision
.by the Supreme Court of Georgia (Btlug'll,(m v. State, 100 Ga.
554 [28 S.E. 68, 70, 38 L.RA. 577]) that under the laws of
Georgia a person convicted of a capital offense and sentenced
to death who thereafter becomes insane has no right to a
: . judicial determination of the question of his sanity. (See,
; ,also, eases collected in 49 A.L.R. 804.) We see no l'eaSOn why
~ . the due process clause of the California Constitution should
~ ,be interpreted differently.
;
The statutes of this state therefore provide the measure of
i, defendant's rights to any determination .of the question
; 'of his sanity. Defendant has thus far been afforded the
; fnll protection of those statutes. Be was entitled to a judicial
~ .determination of the question of his sanity after conviction
to'and sentence only because the warden of the state prison at
r I San Quentin believed that he was insane. The effect of the
t.:~adjudication that he was insane was to prevent his execution
r;1mtil the superintendent of the state hospital to which he
L~was sent certified that he had recovered his reason. His only
. . ; right to another judicial determination of that question de, ,•. pends on the belief and action of the warden of the prison
:'to whose custody he has been returned. (See People v. FM'~~reU, 31 Cal. 576, 581; People v. Rice, 83 Cal.App. 55, 61 [256
;~~.P. 450].)
I ~" This court has already decided that the authority given
/ ~.rthe warden constitutes adequate protection to one who has
t l been properly convicted of a capital offense. In People v.
~:8loper, 198 Cal. 601, 607-608 [246 P. 802J, the defendant was
~eomvieted of murder
the 11m clesno 8IId _ _ 10

I

m

1
'<

J.':'"

.•~--

)

848

!

/

[30 C.2d

death. On appeal to this court, the judgment was affirmed.
Defendant then sought to prevent the fixing of a date for
execution and to obtain a trial on the question of his sanity.
Upon the denial of this motion, defendant applied to this
court for a stay of execution. In denying the application,
this court, on the authority of Penal Code section 1221 (now
§ 3700), held that no court in this state has the power to
suspend the execution of a judgment of death to determine the question of the sanity of a person who became
insane after his conviction and sentence. The court stated
that "adequate statutory provision is made for the complete
protection of the rights of a defendant who may have become
insane after his conviction and sentence. • • • If it be found
that defendant is insane [pursuant to these statutesJ, the
court must direct that he be taken to one of the state hospitals for the insane, and there kept in safe confinement until
his reason is restored. When the defendant recovers his
reason the superintendent of the hospital must certify that
fact to the Governor, who must thereupon issue to the warden
his warrant appointing a day for the execution of the
judgment.••• We must conclude, therefore, that it was
the intention of the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of
the trial court, in proceedings of this nature to the making
of the orders necessary to carry the judgment into effect. 'Ve are of opinion also, that, in view of the comprehensive and adequate provision made for the determination
of the question of the sanity of a defendant who is alleged
to have become insane after the rendition of a judgment
of death, no substantial right of the defendant Sloper was
affected by the action of the court below in denying his
motion. . • • If it be a fact in this ease that the condemned
man is insane, it must be assumed that the warden of the
state prison will do his full duty to the end that the question of the prisoner's sanity may be judicially determined."
In the Sloper ease, there was no prior adjudication of
insanity, but the opinion contains a clear expression of approval of the procedure thus far followed in the present case.
[7] Petitioner contends, however, that because a court of
law determined that the defendant was insane, only a court
of law can determine that he is now sane. This contention
is clearly inconsistent with section 3700 of the Penal Code
and with the cases interpreting the provision of section 1372
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of that code similar to the provision of section 3704. Sections
37()()"3704 of the Penal Code provide for the adjudication,
not of some continuing status, but only of the question
whether the defendant is sane at the time of the hearing
initiated by the warden. Moreover, the adjudication relied
on by the petitioner did not purport to decide what the condition of defendant's mind would be thereafter. There
was no determination that defendant's insanity was incurable, even if it is assumed that such a determination would
have been within the court's jurisdiction. The defendant
was found insane at that time, and his execution was suspended only until he recovered his reason. It was the order
. of the court that the defendant be kept in confinement in the
; state hospital until he recovered his reason and "when said
. William Jerome Phyle recovers his reason, that the Superin;~ tendent of the State Hospital in which he is conftned certify
, that fact to the Governor of the State of California for further
: proceedings as is required by law." There is therefore no
:. merit to the contention that the adjudication that defendant
, was insane at the time of this trial gave him a vested right
to .the status of an insane person thereafter or until a court
of law determined that he is sane.
.' [8] The petitioner contends also that the separation of
i powers provision of section 1 of article In of the California
',' .Constitution is violated by leaving the final determination of
, a prisoner's sanity to administrative officers. The contention
~ that the power to determine the question of restoration to
!8anity of such a person cannot be given to the superintendent
;)as already been answered adversely in this state in People
~ 'v. Superior Court, 4 Ca1.2d 136, 146, supra, and Peopu v.
'. 1ltu, 83 Cal.App. 55, 60, St'pra. In these cases it was held to
~,be within the proper scope of the superintendent's powers to
~.C1etermine the question of the restoration to sanity of defend~i.nta who had been adjudged insane before conviction. There~)dter the defendants were returned to the judge pursuant to
/
' iection
1372 of the Penal Code and their trial continued. The
.
,,/
Judge
at that time could again have concluded pursuant to
, section 1368 that it was doubtful whether the defendant was
'Dne, and provided for a determination of the question in
• proper judicial proceeding. (See People v. Ji'arrell, 31 Cal.
576, 581, supra; People v. Rice, supra, at 61.) In this case
that power and duty is given to the warden by section 3701
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of the Penal Code, for the defendant is returned, not to a
court but to the warden.
[9] Even if the warden's power in this regard is judicial, there is no violation of section 1 of article III of the
California Constitution, for section 7 of article X specifically
provides that "Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere
ift, this Constitution, the Legislature may provide for the establishment, government, charge and superintendence of all
institutions for all persons convicted of felonies. For this
purpose, the Legislature may delegate the government, charge
and superintendence of such institutions to any public governmental agency or agencies, officers, or board or boards,
whether now existing or hereafter created by it. Any of such
agenciu, officers, or boards shall have such powers, perform
IUCh dutiu and eurcise such functions in respect to other
reformatory or penaZ matters, as the Legislature may prescnDe." (Italics added.)
The delegation of power contained in the former sections
of the Penal Code on this subject (§§ 1221-1224) was
validated by the same section of the Constitution in the following terms: "All existing statutes • • • purporting • . .
to 80 delegate such government, charge and superintendence,
to 80 prescribe such powers, duties or functions • . • are
hereby ratified, validated and declared to be legally effective
until the Legislature provides otherwise." By :noving these
provisions from one part of the Penal Code to another, the
Legislature did not change their effect. (Pen. Code, § 10000.)
[10] Even if it is assumed that the power of the superintendent of the state hospital, to whom defendant was delivered, to determine whether defendant has recovered his reason
is a judicial power, the foregoing provisions of the California Constitution authorize the delegation of this power.
Under the statutes the ~risoner is delivered to the custody
of the superintendent as a person convicted of a felony, and
thereafter, 80 far as the superintendent's authority over such
a person is concerned the superintendent exercises not only
I
the authority of an officer entrusted with the superintendence
/ of an institution for convicted felons but the duties and functions prescribed in Penal Code, section 3704.
It follows that unless the warden of the prison in which
defendant is incarcerated believes that defendant is now
insane, no court of this state has jurisdiction to determine
the question of his sanity. It has been suggested that this
conclusion must be wrong on the ground that if the mat-
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ter is left to the discretion of the warden, a circular proces..'i
may begin whereby defendant will again be found insane,
again sent to a state hospital, and again declared restored to
sanity. It has therefore been suggested that only a judicial
determination of this question at this time will prevent such
circuity. This suggestion is based on the assumptions that
the warden believes that defendant is insane, that a jury would
find him to be insane, and that the superintendent of the
Mendocino State Hospital was in error - assumptions that
this court cannot properly make. Moreover, it does not follow that a judicial determination of this question will prevent
circuity. If this court were to hold that defendant has a right
to a judicial determination of the question of his restoration
to sanity under some procedure not specified in Penal Code,
sections 3700 to 3704, such a determination would be either
that defendant is sane or insane. If the verdict is that he
is insane, the defendant would have to be delivered to an
institntion and detained there until in a judicial proceeding
he was found sane. If the verdict is that he is sane, the defendant would be delivered to the warden for execution, and
the date for execution would have to be set again. During
the interval between this adjudication and the date for exe·
cution, the defendant may again become insane. Unless the
warden is to execute an insane person in violation of Penal
Code, section 1367, it would be the warden's duty, if he had
good reason to believe that defendant was insane, to set in
motion again the procedure for determining the defendant's
sanity. The duty of preventing execution of an insane person is given by statute to the warden and to the Governor,
and even if it were held that defendant has a right to a judicial determination of the question of his sanity, the determination that he is sane at the time finally set for his execution
must be made by the warden.
The writ is discharged, and William Jerome Phyle is remanded to custody.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., eon/ eurred..
SCHAUER, J.-I dissesnt.
I cannot agree that the privnege of the writ of habeas COl'pus may be denied to a person solely because he has been
convicted of crime, sentenced to death, adjudged insane, and
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committed to a state hospital; nor can I agree that the powers
vested in the warden of a state prison or in the medical superintendent of a state hospital for the insane transcend and abrogate the powers of the courts to entertain proceedings on
habeas corpus. It is indisputable, I think, that the powers of
the courts on habeas corpus proceedings are substantially abrogated in cases of this type by the holding of the majority
opinion that the factual determination of an administrative
agent is absolutely conclusive on the courts in such proceedings.
The real issue here is not what is stated in the majority
opinion. It really is more simple and much more grave. On
behalf of the prisoner it is alleged in material part "That
on the 24th day of December, 1946, after a jury trial in the
Superior Court . . . William Jerome Phyle [the prisoner]
was adjudged insane, and said Superior Court committed
said ... Phyle to the State Hospital at Talmadge, to be held
there as an insane person, and there kept in a state of confinement until his reason be restored. [Italics added.]
"That thereafter, said Wililam .Terome Phyle remained in
the Mendocino State Hospital at Talmadge, California, until
January 18, 1947, at which time the Superintendent of the
Mendocino State Hospital presented to the Governor his certificate that the said William Jerome Phyle had recovered his
reason, whereas said Phyle was, and still is, insane. [Italics
added.]
"That thereafter, the Governor of the State of California
isued to the Warden [of the state prison] the Governor'.
warrant, appointing the 2nd day of May, 1947 for the execution by means of lethal gas of William Jerome Phyle.•.•
"That unless this Court restrains Clinton T. Du1fy [the
warden of the state prison] from carrying out the warrant of
the Governor,. that said . • • Phyle will be executed on Friday, the 2nd day of May, 1947."
According to the return to the writ, the prisoner had been
sentenced to death; thereafter upon proper legal proceed":
ings under chapter 2, article 3, part 3 of the Penal Code, a
jury found he was insane and the superior court on December
24, 1946, ordered that he be confined in a state hospital "until
his reason be restored"; the superintendent of such hospital
on January 18. 1947, !'ertified to the governor that he was
aane; the governor made his warrant of execution; and the

•
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warden holds the prisoner pursuant to such sentence and
warrant.
The controlling facts shown by the petition and return. are
that the prisoner was duly adjudged insane and committed
by judgment of the superior court to be confined in a state
hospital "until his reason be restored"; that his reason laas
not in fact been restored (that he "was, and still is, insane")
but that, notwithstanding the judgment and his continuing
insanity he has been released from the state hospital and the
custody of its superintendent and transferred to the state
prison and custody of the warden and will be executed while
insane unless this court intervenes. It is most important to
Dote that the vital allegation that the prisoner "was, and still
is, insane," is not challenged in the return and must be
deemed admitted. The majority opinion necessarily holds
that this fact, or at least the allegation of it, is wholly immaterial because the superintendent of the hospital has presumptively determined and has certified that the prisoner
has recovered his reason; such determination and certification,
the majority hold, are conclusive on the prisoner and on this
court; hence habeas corpus will be denied. Obviously, the
determination of the majority does not rest upon any inquiry
or determination by the ccmrl as to the fact of sanity or insanity of the prisoner; it rests squarely on the hOlding that
the administrative agent has sole and uncontrolled authority
to determine and certify the fact of sanity or insanity and
that such fact, when so certified, cannot be disputed by the
, prisoner or inquired into by the eourt. This, clearly, is abrogation of the rights and powers of habeas corpus in such

.'case.
{., Contrary to the implications of the majority opinion (the
'.order reads, "The writ is discharged, and William Phyle ill!
~,remanded to custody" [italics added]), the petition does not
i: seek release of the prisoner; as appears on its face and as
hereinafter shown in detail, it seeks only to have him trans; :Cerred in custody from an unlawful to a lawful custodian;
I i.e., from the custody of the warden of the prison to the
/ custody of the superintendent of the state hospital. .As is also
, . more particularly shown hereinafter, upon the unchallenged
, 'facts alleged. the supel'intt'ndent of the hospital is the sole
, lawful custodian of the prisoner.

:.m
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The relief sought may be granted on petition for habeas
corpus. Section 1493 of the Penal Code provides that "In
cases where any party is held under 'illegal restraint or CU.~
tody, or any other person is entitled to the restraint or custody
of such party, the judge or court may order such party to be
committed to the restraint or custody of such person as is
by law entitled thereto." (Italics added.) Section 1487 of
the same code provides that "If it appears on the return
of the writ that the prisoner is in eu..'!tody by virtue of
process from any court of this state, or judge or of6eer
thereof, such prisoner may be discharged or remanded
te proper custody as provided by section 1486] ••. 5.
When the person having the custody of the prisoner is
not the person allowed by law to detain him." As previously set forth, the petition alleges facts which indubitably entitle the prisoner to the relief sought if the facts
be true. Such facts are that the prisoner has been convicted
of crime and sentenced to death; that after such conviction
he was duly adjudged insane and committed to the state hospital "to be there confined until his reason be reStored"; that
he "was, and still is, insane"; that notwithstanding the actual
eontinuance of his insanity the superintendent of the hospital
has certified that he is sane and he has been transferred from
the custody of the hospital superintendent to the custody of
the prison warden and that he will be executed by the prison
warden unless this court restrains such action.
From what has been above related it appears that the basic
issue here is, is the asserted determination of the medical superintendent that the prisoner is now sane conclusive on the
court and on the prisoner in a habeas corpus proceeding
wherein it is alleged that the prisoner is in fact insane' In
other words, does certification of sanity by the state hospital
superintendent preclude the prisoner from alleging and proving and the court from detennining that, contrary to the certification, the prisoner is in truth insane! If the answer to
these questions is yes, as the majority hold, then the right of
habeas corpus is effectively abrogated as to persons in the
status of the prisoner before us.
The holding of the majority opinion that the medical superintendent has exclusive and transcendant powers to detennine
questions of sanity of prisoners is squarely contrary to earlier
holdings of this court. In Gardner v. Jonel (1899), 126 Cal.

)

)
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614 [59 P. 126], we find a case which in material legal principles is identical to that now before us. Dr. A. 'M. Gardner
was then (1899) superintendent of the Napa State Hospital.
He applied to this court "for a writ to prohibit defendant
[judge of the superior court of Contra Costa county, and the
superior court of Napa County] from entertaining jurisdiction in a certain habeas corpus case" whereby the Napa
Comity Superior Court was assuming to determine the question of the restoration to sanity of one Bucllanan, who had
been committed to the state hospital as insane. This court
said (pages 615-616 of 126 Cal.), "The question is an important one, inasmuch 88 it involves the right of an inmate
of a state hospital, who happens at the time to be resting
under a criminal charge and is committed pending trial for
his crime. to have his alleged insanity made the subject of
judicial inquiry by the writ of habeas corpus. It is claimed
'(exactly as here] that 'the medical superintendent u the only

·perlon (Jf' tnOunaZ vested by 'law with authority to d8termine
w7&et7&er (Jf' not an insane patienf of thu elMI 7t& rec01J·tJf'6d.' •••

"The provisions of the Penal Code regulating the commitment of persons charged with crime are found in sections
1367 to 1373. No quesHon arises as to the regularity of Buchanan's commitment under these provisions. Section 1372 prorides as follows 'If the defendant is received into the asylum,
he must be detained there until he becomes sane. When he
becomes sane, the superintendent must give notice of that fact
to the sheri1f and district attorney of the county. The sheri1f
must thereupon, without delay, bring the defendant from the
:asylum and place him in proper custody until he is brought
to trial or judgment, as the case may be. or is legally discharged.'
: "Section 1473 of the Penal Code provides 88 follows:
'Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his h'barty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of
labeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment
restraint.'
/ . "Section 5, article I, of the constitution reads: 'The
. privilege of the writ of habeas COrp'UI shall not be suspended
unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
Safety may require its suspension.'

.or

)
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"We find in the statute no authority for making two classes
of insane--one civil and the other criminal-and by any such
classification to take the latter out of the operation of the
statute as to the right of habeas corpus. Section 13, article
III, of the insanity law makes no such distinction. But
plaint itT contends that section 14 of article III in terms confers authority upon the medical superintendent to determine
when the patient of the criminal class is restored to sanity,
and, as the authority is not conferred upon any other person or tribunal, it is necessarily exclusive, and also proves
that the law recognizes the two mentioned classes of insane.
We cannot believe that the legislature intended to enact a
law so entirely out of harmony with the spirit and letter of
the constitution and the statute to which attention has been
called. It is our duty to harmonize sections 13 and 14, article
III, of the insanity law, so as to conform to the constitution
and to the statutes quoted, if we can, rather than resort to
the more extreme necessity of holding section 14 to be unconstitutional, as defendant claims it to be, if given the
construction placed upon it by plaintiff. We think it was
intended by section 14 to provide means by which a patient
of Buchanan's class, whose reason has become restored, could
be at once remanded to the sheriff of the proper county for
trial; but it was not intended that the arbitrary power
should rest with the medical superintendent to deprive the
patient of the right to be so returned, nor was " intended
tkat tke medical superintendent skould be tke ea:clusi1Je judge
of tke patienfs restoration. [Italics added.] •..
"[Po 618.] The question of Buchanan's recovery, in our
opinion, is jurisdictional and may be examined upon habeas
corpus• •••
"[Po 619.] Section 1493 [Pen. Code] provides: 'In cases
where any party is held under illegal restraint or custody, or
any other person is entitled to the restraint or custody of
such party, the judge or court may order such party to be
committed to the restraint or custody of such person as is
by law entitled thereto.' In his petition Buchanan does not
ask to be restored to his freedom; he asks to be rede1ivered
to the sheriff of Yuba county..•• We see no reason why
the court or judge should not have the power by an order
to direct that Buchanan be redelivered to the sheriff as
prayed for••••"
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In accord with the reasoning above quoted the application
of the medical superintendent for the writ of prohibition
was denied and thereafter in the habeas corpus proceeding
the superior court proceeded to determine the issue as to
the defendant's restoration to sanity. It determined that the
defendant-petitioner was still insane and remanded him to
tke custody of Dr. Gardner. Thereupon application for
habeas corpus was made to this court. Chief Justice Beatty,
authoring the opinion of the court, again referred to Dr.
Gardner's claim of exclusive jurisdiction, as asserted in his
~ application for, prohibition, and declared (In re Buchanaft
f,(1900), 129 Cal. 330, 332-333 [61 P. 1120, 50 A.L.R. 378]),
r "It was there [in Gardner v. Jones (1899), supra, 126 Cal.
\,' 614] contended that the insanity law of 1897 Stats. 1897, p.
311) has made the superintendent of the asylum the sole and
I" :ftnal judge, in a case of this kind, whether the prisoner has
~~ become sane, and that the courts no longer have the power
~ to conduct the inquiry by habeas corpus, or otherwise. It
~ Was held against this contention that the question of unlawful
r; ,,.estraint of the liberty of (J citizen ii, and must be as long as
~; our present constitution endures, (J iudici4l question to be
, determined by the courts, (Jnd tkat tke statute ,.eferred to
, tDould be unconstitutional if it required the constf'UCtion COft'. teftded for. [Italics added.] ••• In consequence of this
decision the superior judge proceeded with the hearing upon
" return to the writ of habeas corpus issued by him, and having
r 'concluded upon the evidence that Buchanan was still insane,
made an order remanding him to the custody of Dr. Gardner.
Thereupon the present proceeding was commenced in this
~ court, and upon the same evidence submitted to the superior
r, 'judge, and some additional testimony, we must MtD decide
~. tke quesfioft of fact whether Buchanan kaa become MM.
;[ItaliCS added.1
,;,:, "The question, however, is not whether he has become sane
i In every sense of the word, but whether he has become sane
~'m the sense of the statute, which requires a suspension of
}: the proceedings in a criminal cause whenever it is found
, that the defendant is presently insane. In other words, if
/\ there is a difference between the medical view of insanity
,,': and the view upon which the statute is founded, the question
of sanit¥. or insanity ja ~ be determined with reference to
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the latter as contra-distinguished from the former view.
That there is such a difference is notorious.•.. " In the light
of that diiference the writ was sustained and Buchanan was
ordered "returned to the custody of the sheriif of Yuba
county." (Here we have no way of knowing what standard
of sanity or insanity the present superintendent of the state
hospital applied in certifying that the prisoner is sane.)
Several vices in the majority opinion become apparent from
what has been quoted from Gordner v. Jonu (1899), ""pro,
126 Cal. 614, and from 1# re BUCMM# (1900), ""prtJ, 129
Cal. 330. In the t1rst place, the majority opinion unconstitutionally denies the protection of habeas corpus, at least as
exemplliied by a court trial of the issue of fact (if there be one
under the pleadings in view of the failure to deny that the
prisoner is presently insane) to this petitioner. Our state
Constitution (art. I, § 5) declares that "The privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus sliall not be suspended unless when,
in eases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require its suspension." Section 9(2) of article I of the United
States Constitution makes the same provision. There is in
this case no suggestion that there is e:xtant any status of
rebellion or invasion whereby to justify suspension of the
writ in the public safety. But the majority opinion, in all
practical effect, suspends it-even abrogates it altogetherin so far as concerns persons who have been convicted of
crime, sentenced to death, and thereafter adjudged insane.
If the prisoner's insanity in fact continues, as is specifica.lly
alleged and not denied, the law and the judgment of the
superior court require that he be continued in the state hospital until his sanity is restored. As shown hereinabove,
habeas corpus is a proper remedy. If we refuse him the
relief sought, solely on the ground that the medical superintendent's certificate of restoration is conclusive of the fact
of sanity, we are necessarily abrogating our power in the
premises-our power to determine the :fact of insanity. And,
furthermore, we are abrogating the right of the prisoner to
I even challenge, on habeas corpus, one of the facts upon which
/ the legality of his custody and impending execution depends.
/ That is certainly an abrogation of the right of habeas corpus.
No authority is cited for holding that a person in the status
of this prisoner may be deprived of the rights of habeas
corpus.

)
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It is important also to note that section 1367 of the Penal
Code provides that "A person cannot be tried, adjudged to
punishment, or punished for a public o1fense, while he is
insane." If this section means anything at all it should mean
that it establishes a right which a convicted person, sane or
insane, or one who speaks for him, may enforce in the courts.
If the courts cannot enforce it, it is a poor right. If the
right of habeas corpus is to be denied to such a person it
should be by clear constitutional provision, not by court
legislation.
It should be observed also that the State may eventually
find that the majority holding here is unfortunate. If the
statutes in question, as held by the majority, vest absolute,
conclusive, and exclusive power in the superintendent of the
state hospital "for the determination of the question of the
sanity of a person who has been sentenced to death," and
if it be true, as is also held by the majority, that "a court
has no inherent power to determine that question," then, of
course, the determination of the superintendent is equally
final regardless of whether he determine that the prisoner
. is sane or insane. In some future case such a superintendent
may rule that a prisoner remains insane although other state
officers have reason to believe that such prisoner has recovered
, his sanity. Under the majority holding, the fact of recovered
sanity would be wholly immaterial; an allegation to that
e1feet, although not denied, would be totally disregarded.
INeither the prisoner himself nor. the prosecuting officers of
l'the state would be heard to contend that in truth the prisoner
had recovered his reason. Only the certificate of the superintendent, based on any standard of sanity (medical or legal)
which he might elect to use, could determine that fact; his
, discretion in any event would be wholly uncontrolled and
~ if he refused to give the certUicate the courts of this state'
would be powerless to intervene.
f . The majority opinion devotes much space to a discussion
f' of the duties and powers of the hospital superintendent and
those of the prison warden and suggests that the warden,
~ if 80 disposed, can again initiate proceedings for another jury
~trial on the issue of the prisoner's present sanity status. But
, such speculation is scarcely germane to the issue before us.
,.The duties of the warden are one thi.nsi our duties on habeas
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corpus are quite another. The petition alleges that "unless
this Court restrains Clinton T. Du£ry [the prison warden]
from carrying out the warrant of the Governor, that said ..•
[prisoner] will be executed on Friday, the 2nd day of May,
1947." The fact that the writ prayed for originally issued
and that in consequence the date of e.xecuti~n has been postponed until this cause is finally decided, does not mean
that the jeopardy of the prisoner is lessened. The allegation,
coupled with the other averments above quoted,· still unmistakably means that the prisoner, although presently insane,
will be executed under the warrant which has been issued
unless we rule otherwise. Whether that allegation be true,
the majority hold, we will not inquire because we have no
power in any event to prevent the execution. I cannot subscribe to such a doctrine.
Failure to espouse such doctrine does not mean that any
statute in question is made meaningless. The provisions
of Penal Code section 3704 that "When the defendant recovers his reason the superintendent of such [state] hospital '
must certify that fact to the Governor" and that the defendant may then be returned to prison and executed, like
the provisions of section 1372, hereinabove cited and discussed in the quotation from the Ga$er case, may be
given e1fect and applied in all proper cases. Under the
language of that section (§ 3704) it may well be that a
superintendent of a state hospital has implied authority to
make a prima facie determination that a prisoner has recovered (or not recovered) his sanity and to certify him
back to the warden of the state prison for execution. But
this does not mean that the prisoner must be denied habeas
corpus, or an examination and determination by 1M court
upon habeas corpus, of the fact, if it be alleged, that the
prisoner is in fact insane (or sane) although the superin.
tendent may have determined and certified that he is sane
(or insane).
The history of habeas corpus, the great care with which
the rights of all persons to invoke that remedy have been
guarded by provisions of our national and state constitutions
and the jealous solicitude with which the courts have heretofore protected those rights, all combine to forbid the hold·
ing which the prosecuting officers of this State now espouse
and which the majority make.
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The State, if it requests such relief, should be given opportunity to challenge the now admitted averment that the
prisoner "still is" insane; that issue should then be tried out
before a referee; and our order should depend on our determination of the fact, not on subservience to an asserted
"conclusive" determination of an administrative agent. Thus
may the right of habeas corpus be preserved, the court
maintain its jurisdiction, and justice still run its full course.
Carter, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Deeember .8, 1947. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a
rehearing.
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